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A
ylward and Thorne (1998) investigate sovereign debtors’ repayment per-
formance vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund. They distinguish
through logit analysis between countries that make timely repayments and
those that run into arrears. Their conclusion is, inter alia, that the inclusion of
IMF-specific financial variables and a small number of macroeconomic vari-
ables yields a highly significant econometric model of the probability of a
country incurring IMF arrears. Aylward and Thorne also compare the countries’
repayment behavior vis-à-vis the IMF and other creditors, respectively. They
find that the number of countries that have incurred protracted arrears to the
IMF is much smaller than the number of countries that have failed to service
their debt to other creditors and/or had to enter into debt-rescheduling arrange-
ments. In addition, political instability seems to play a more prominent role
among the most protracted cases of IMF arrears than it does among countries
with non-IMF-specific repayment problems.
Although Aylward and Thorne point out the importance of political and sociopo-
litical factors for debt servicing, they rely mainly on financial and macroeconomic
indicators in their empirical analysis. Past experience of threatened and deliberate
debt-service interruptions, especially since the debt crisis in the 1980s, has led to an
understandable focus in the literature on debtors’ willingness to honor their debt-
service obligations (see the overview in Cataquet, 1985, and Saunders, 1986). Most
approaches in that strand of the literature take as their starting point a “social
planner” (not specified in detail) who maximizes the country’s expected utility by
deciding for or against honoring its debt contracts as a benevolent dictator. In the
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empirical country-risk literature, payment interruptions are explained using multi-
variate risk indicators. Their choice does not, in general, reflect a theoretically sound
explanation model, but rather plausibility considerations. This may, of course, lead
to a misspecification of the econometric model, which is especially problematic if
the model is used for credit evaluations. 
Financial indicators are the result of past economic conditions and policies as
well as having an impact on current conditions and policies. But it is the general
policy stance of the government that determines the direction of financial policies.
These might, in addition, be influenced by short-term factors like external crises
or internal political pressures. A pure ex post analysis of financial and macroeco-
nomic indicators can therefore be misleading if used for credit decisions, even if
the identified parameters linking them to the likelihood of arrears are highly sig-
nificant. Consequently, the sociopolitical background must be included in the pic-
ture to check against policy changes, etc., especially if the political structures
embodied in time series (past repayment history) are used for ex ante or out-of-
sample forecasts (time-specific effects model). Aylward and Thorne (p. 612) take
up a similar point with their notion of a “state-dependent design for the model.”
But for ex ante forecasts of arrears, a dummy variable for past arrears is only a
beginning. A change of government, or even changing moods within a govern-
ment, can suffice per se to change its debt-servicing stance and should therefore
be taken into account. Therefore, credit institutions, insurance companies, regula-
tory authorities, and rating agencies, which have high value at risk, explicitly
include sociopolitical elements in their sovereign-risk models (see overview in
Haque, Mathieson, and Park, 1997, and in Bäcker, 1998a, ch. 2). This is despite
the fact that standardized economic data are generally more detailed, more timely,
and less expensive to obtain than the demographic, social, and political data of
some emerging countries. 
A Politicoeconomic Approach
The academic country-risk literature has so far been influenced very little
by the findings of the political or new political economics departing from
Nordhaus (1975). Therefore, the question arises as to how internal political
pressure from lobby or interest groups can lead to debt-service problems, for
example, opposition to adjustment measures recommended by the IMF or pub-
lic protest against foreign banks. (See Haggard and Kaufmann, 1989, p. 248,
and Nunnenkamp and Picht, 1989, pp. 696–97). Bäcker (1998a and 1998b)
introduces a stylized politicoeconomic model that integrates these considera-
tions. It departs from the fact that citizens are affected in many ways by their
government’s external obligations and the adjustment measures these imply. In
the framework of  the balance of payments and excluding asset transactions, the
external debt service ultimately has to be raised by primary current account sur-
pluses. That implies a corresponding reduction of internal absorption. Looked
at the other way round, the current account surpluses of an open economy entail
a surplus of savings over investment. This means that, other things being equal,
higher external debt-service payments lead to heavier burdens through taxation,reductions in public investment, social welfare spending, and public services.
General political and psychological factors such as status thinking etc. also play
a role (Lissakers, 1991, pp. 199-200).
In Bäcker’s model (1998a and 1998b), the population is divided into distinct
groups, which assess the advantages and disadvantages stemming from debt service
differently. Their subjective reactions determine the individual support or opposi-
tion of the group members for or against the government’s (debt-service) policy.
This results in an individual net support, which can be translated into a probability
of that individual voting for the government’s policy. The government, therefore,
chooses a debt-service level that maximizes the overall support for its policy among
the population (measured as a weighted sum of support probabilities). Aylward and
Thorne’s observation of a relatively low probability of countries defaulting on IMF
debt versus other debt fits in well with this. This is no doubt owing to the central
role that the IMF plays in the international financial system. The IMF’s status
means that a default on IMF loans will probably prove far costlier to a debtor coun-
try, in terms of direct or indirect sanctions, than will a default on commercial debt;
therefore, it will normally be considered only as a last resort.
Debt-servicing capacity can consequently be interpreted as the result of a
politicoeconomic evaluation process that integrates the general economic and
sociopolitical situation, the individual preferences of each citizen as well as the
political optimization calculus of the government. One of this model’s advantages
lies, inter alia, in its ability to allow for an analysis of internal policy conflicts. In
an extreme case, the politicopsychological state of a society could be so strained
that a debt reduction could make an increase in net debt service possible by damp-
ening the opposition. This result implies the existence of a politicoeconomic debt-
service Laffer curve, analogous to the original debt relief Laffer curve, which was
founded on pure economic terms.
Determinants that have so far been rather neglected in the literature are now
highlighted: the costs and benefits of contractual debt obligations as subjectively
perceived by different population groups; their individual information and time
preference; their evaluation, depending on the opportunity cost of the debt service,
which translates the perceived costs and benefits into a measure of government
policy support; features that transform the resulting net support into a likelihood
of voting for the government’s current (debt service) policy; and the different
group sizes or the political influence of population groups with diverging opinions
on foreign debt service. This is in line with Aylward and Thorne’s finding (p. 603)
that a large part of the variation in countries’ repayment behavior is country spe-
cific rather than attributable to macroeconomic variables.
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